Chapter 10. The Conflict and Sustainable Development
The Zionist program has always been built around the concept of "reclaiming" the ancestral Jewish homeland by building extra-state institutions" (World Zionist Organization, Jewish Agency etc), establishing Jewish land ownership through various mechanisms (largely involving ethnic cleansing of non-Jews), and expanding settlements, borders and control over land and natural resources. The settlements and borders continuously expanded in territory of hostile natives. The initial large-scale replacement of population met with obstacles but still succeeded in transforming the country from a predominantly Arab and Muslim (with some Christian and Jewish Arabs and others) to a predominantly Ashkenazi-led state with Zionist laws. Yet, Palestine/Israel now has some 9 million people and nearly half are still Palestinian natives. Israeli leaders are frantically seeking to maintain the demographic "edge." A three pronged program is now obvious to attempt to accomplish this seemingly impossible task: a) preventing refugees from returning, b) incentives and other tools to lure in as many Jewish (or even non-Jewish but not native) immigrants who identify with Zionism, and c) making life so hard for the remaining Palestinians that they leave (or even outright removing them). It was thus inevitable that there would be sever environmental effects of on this fragile sliver of land on the Eastern Mediterranean region, cut off from its hinterland in the Middle East. Any proposed solution must take these issues into consideration.
Palestinian and Israeli Economies and Societies: Separate and Unequal
The initial Zionist settlements in Palestine between 1880 and 1917 had only marginal negative effect on some Fellahin (as pointed out in Chapter 4). There were no major structural changes in the economy under Ottoman rule and no real modernization. The devastation of the first world war was rather uniform. However, between 1917 and 1948, major socioeconomic structural changes came about. According to Dr. Sara Roy, "the evolution of two distinct socioeconomic orbits was neither entirely accidental nor entirely planned, but the result of policies that combined to limit the interaction between Jews and Arabs, and in effect promoted the development of one group at considerablke cost to the other."1.
When Israel was established in 1948 only one-quarter of the Palestinians remained within this self-defined "Jewish State". Those who remained continued to experience the separate and unequal treatment (discussed in Chapter 7). The majority made refugees between 1947 and 1949 settled very close proximity to the new borders. Many settled in the West Bank and Gaza within the borders of historic Palestine and an area that was later conquered by Israel in 1967. The success in 1947-1949 of driving out three quarters of the local inhabitants empowered Israeli leaders to bring massive waves of Jewish immigrants from all over the world to this tiny piece of land. The process of removal of natives and colonizing by new immigrants has occurred in other countries, but never in such a concentrated manner and on a small piece of land with limited resources. In 1967, the second phase of Israeli "reclamation" commenced as Israel invaded and acquired the additional areas of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza, and the Golan Heights. This only helped deepen the environmental and social catastrophe.
After the removal of most of the native Palestinians in 1947-1949, early Zionist propaganda promulgated the myth that the area was mostly desert and mostly ignored by any population. A myth was also disseminated that "Arabs" came to Palestine because of the economic opportunities created by the Zionist immigration. In this regard a comparison to Lebanon is quite revealing. Lebanon has an area of 10400 square kilometers and a population of nearly four million, excluding the 350,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. There are over 3-4 million Lebanese immigrants that came to the Americas (most left Lebanon between 1895-1920). The population of Palestinians is about 9 million (including all refugees Christians and Muslims, excluding Zionist settlers and their progeny in the past 80 years). The area they come from is an area about 2.5 times the size of Lebanon. The numbers suggest that Lebanon had historically more density of population than Palestine. Since no Zionist economic enterprises were developed in Lebanon, one questions the mythology of mass immigration of "Arabs" because of Zionist development. We must also look carefully at the impact of the Zionist program on the environment and on the possibility of sustainable development. This topic is important because natural resources and the environment are key to a future of prosperity and peace for all people.
When Israel was established in 1948, over 800,000 Palestinians were rendered homeless. Israel acquired over 100,000 abandoned Palestinian homes, nearly 2 million acres of their land, thousands of businesses, and all public infrastructure in Palestine. This together with infusion of money from German reparations, US government and private donations were to become the raw material to build a westernized state with significant economic and military power. The economic disparity between the ruling Zionist class and the remaining Palestinians intensified with income disparity jumping significantly especially in the 1960s. Israel also wanted to ensure a demographic majority of Jews and in slow stages fulfill the Zionist dreams of building a vibrant Jewish nation. Thus, all sorts of incentives, tools and methods were used to bring the maximum number of Jews to the new state while thinning out any remaining non-Jews. The few remaining Palestinians lost much of their land through additional confiscation (150,000 Palestinians remaining while 800,000 made refugees). Israel confiscated nearly 40% of the land of the remaining Palestinians (in addition to the two million acres it had taken from their fleeing relatives). The expropriated land was used by the new Jewish collectives called kibbutzim and moshavim. However, not all confiscated lands could be used and so much of it, including lands of many of the 500 depopulated Palestinian villages, was turned into parks and woodland. These were designated as "protected public areas" to keep the former owners from coming back and to bring in needed cash from forestation programs. They were good source of additional state income as the Jewish National Fund developed programs to "Plant trees in Israel" and push the idea of "turning the desert green". Most of the trees were planted in areas of previous Palestinian agricultural and fertile lands. The proportion of Palestinian workers tilling the soil dropped from 70% of all Palestinians in 1948 to below 10% of remaining Palestinians by the 1980s. Further, no industrial development was permitted in the remaining Palestinian villages. Many villages were not even recognized so they receive no government services like sewage and water. Palestinians were kept under military rule until 1966 and then a few menial jobs were made more available to them in the booming Jewish cities and settlements.
New Jewish immigrants were allocated the lands and property of the displaced Palestinians. However, the decision-makers were Ashkenazi Jews - who had concepts of European cultural and developmental ethos very different from those of Orientals (including Arab Jews). An economic class structure developed with Ashkenazim at the top followed by Jews from Arab countries, and finally non-Jewish Arabs 2.
This tiered power structure added an even lower layer when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. The newly occupied Palestinians became the lowest rung in this economic totem pole. When Israel's economy improved, there was a little "trickle down" with opening up of menial jobs (constructions, restaurants, etc) for the lower rungs of society. When Israel's economy suffered, Palestinians both within and outside the "green line" of 1949 borders were first to suffer mass unemployment. Thus, while overall unemployment in Israel in 2002 was some 11%, among Palestinians within the green line it stood at 25-30% and in the occupied territories at 60-70%. The West Bank and Gaza further gave a captive market for Israeli goods and services as well as a source for cheap labor.
Palestinians who worked in the Gulf states did send money to their relatives in the occupied territories and this income was used to buy Israeli products made in Ashkenazi owned factories employing lower economic classes. Some of these factories were built inside the occupied areas and even employed Palestinians from these areas at below minimum wage and no health or social benefits.
Changes since 1991
After the Gulf War of 1991, economic and political changes on global scale were evident and Israeli and Palestinian policy and economy had to adapt. The Arab world was divided, the PLO was weakened, and Palestinians lost their jobs in the oil rich Arab countries. Israel's strategy in the early 1990s developed to capitalize on these trends and enshrine once and for all its hegemony on the area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. The Israeli policy required containment of the Palestinian people's aspirations for independence, globalizing Israel's economy, and ensure acceptance of the world community of Israel. This is why Israel revived the Allon plans to formulate them in the Oslo accords signed with a weakened and compromising Palestinian leadership in Tunisia. Israel would be able to keep building settlements and expanding, open its markets, have free access to Arab countries, normalize its relations with countries like India and Pakistan, and yet make sure Palestinians are isolated in ever shrinking areas of dense population without real say in the affairs of the country. For this, the Palestinians would be able to fly their flag in this statelet and run their own vassal state (more like a large prison). Many Israelis are now looking at these plans in retrospect as clearly unworkable. Unforeseen changes were set in motion. Isolating the Palestinians dried up the cheap Palestinian labor which had to be replaced with foreign workers both legal and illegal. This added to the societal and environmental stresses in Israeli society. Settlements and settlers in the occupied territories doubled between 1993-2000 and Jewish industrial production in these areas was encouraged. And while some Palestinian leaders signed onto this unworkable scheme in Oslo, it was difficult for Israeli leaders to get these same Palestinian leaders to sign the final bill of surrender (see chapter 11).
But lulled by the thought of possible resolution of the conflict, the high-tech industry boomed to the benefit of a segment of Israeli society. Israel's isolation from other countries began to dissipate, opening up markets and collaborations in joint projects. Palestinians in the occupied areas by contrast saw the disappearance of even the menial jobs they had. Palestinians within Israel lost the few jobs they had to Russian immigrants. Control on Palestinian movement and strict controls on import and export, which was legitimate under the Oslo accords, ensured a paralysis of any chance of endogenous Palestinian economic development. Thus, Palestinians became more and more dependent on charity from Europe and from Arab states. Indignities and humiliations of daily life added to this ticking time bomb that eventually contributed to the Palestinian uprising of late September 2000. The gap between Palestinians in the occupied territories and the Israeli occupiers and settlers continued to grow. Per capita GNP in the West Bank and Gaza even before the current large-scale destruction and restrictions was at about $1500 ($1000 in Gaza) per year. This compared to $19,000 for Israeli Jews and $7000 for Israeli Muslims 3. Among those with Israeli citizenship, the disparity and economic inequality continues to grow. Between 1987 and 2002, the number of Israeli citizens living in poverty has increased 250% and in 2002, the richest 1% controlled more assets than 90% of the population 4.
The situation today is unchanged. There is still an economic hierarchy, with wealthy Ashkenazi Jews controlling most of the nation's assets and at the bottom are Palestinians in the occupied territories. Between them lie a majority of the Israeli Jews especially the Jews originating Arab countries and "Israeli Arabs". This situation is certainly not conducive to social stability and is a main reason why violence continues. In the case of Israel/Palestine, the issue of land disparity exacerbates the inequality in the economic class structure.
It took 20 years between 1947-1967 to convert a largely Arab Christian and Muslim ownership of the 78% of Palestine that came under Israeli rule to a largely Jewish-Israeli owned and operated country. After 1967, the Israeli governments under labor started to repeat the process in the newly acquired Palestinian territories of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. In the first decade after 1967, and under labor governments, 57,000 settlers were transferred to the occupied areas with lucrative governmental subsidies and incentives. In July 1977, President Jimmy Carter tried to convince the newly elected Likud leader, Menachem Begin, to freeze settlement activity as part of the peace agreements with Egypt. Instead, Begin allocated Ariel Sharon to the task of drafting a program for accelerated settlement activity. According to a report on settlements by the Foundation for Middle East Peace:
Settlements under Likud were designed to bring about a 'demographic transformation' of the territories and a Jewish majority there. The co-chairman of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department, Mattityahu Drobless, noted that the Likud plan "will enable us to bring about the dispersion of the Jewish population from the densely populated urban strip of the coastal plain eastward to the presently empty of Jews areas of Judea and Samaria 5
Between 1977 and 1990, the settler population in the West Bank and Gaza stood at over 200,000 (120,000 Israelis in illegally annexed areas of East Jerusalem). The Declaration of Principles and Oslo agreements between Israel and the PLO did not prohibit settlement expansion or Israeli colonization efforts in the occupied areas. Between 1993 and 2000, the population of settlers in the occupied areas doubled to over 400,000. This occurred, despite the fact that international law is very clear about the illegality of these settlements. Israel occupied the areas in 1967 in a war and these areas were not and cannot be considered as under its sovereignty. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (to which Israel is a signatory) clearly states that the "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" 6.
UN Security Council Resolution 465 of 1980 reads in part that:
..all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East 7.
The number of settlements in the occupied areas in 2001 was as follows: East Jerusalem 11, West Bank 130, Gaza Strop 16, Golan Heights 33 8. Sharon's government further added 35 new settlements between 2001-2002 according to a report by Peace Now. By the year 2000, 150.5 square kilometers of land in the West Bank was being used for Jewish settlements 9. Israel has also built an extensive network of so called "by-pass" roads in the occupied areas. These roads stretched for 340 km in 2000 and now increased significantly. They bypass native Palestinian towns are used to serve the Jewish settlements. Large tracts of lands were confiscated to build these roads, which included 75 meters on either side of the roads as "safety buffers". Trees and hills and any standing structure within the 75 meters on both sides are bulldozed and the areas declared closed military zones to Palestinians. The total area used in the West Bank for these roads is 51.2 square kilometers in 2000. Added to the 150.5 square kilometers of built up areas for the settlements/colonies, we find that over 200 square kilometers of land was "developed" for settlers/colonists. This land was either used by Palestinians for agriculture or was development land to allow the expansion of villages and towns. Accommodating 200,000 settlers in the built-up areas of the settlements results in a density of about 1000 settlers/colonists per square kilometer of developed land. Palestinians in the West Bank make 2.5 million people living in a built up area of 367.7 sq. km.; a density of 6800 Palestinians per square kilometer. The disparity between settlers and natives in land control, economy, and access is also compounded by disparity in use of other natural resources especially water.
Water in the Land of Canaan has always been in limited supply for the existing population even before large-scale immigration and settlement activity that constituted the Zionist enterprise. The story of water and its allocation in the land of Canaan does not reflect any rational allocation based on population needs and does not reflect international law governing shared resources but merely reflects an imbalance of power heavily tilted towards Israel 10. A case in point is the resources of the Jordan River basin. The Jordan River collects its waters from Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. International law requires equitable and fair use of this water resource. Yet, Israel diverts and used most of the water resources for its own use (e.g. irrigation of the Negev region). The same has happened with the large underground aquifers in the West Bank. The UN Commission on Human Rights reported in 2000 that:
- Occupation practices that affect the natural environment of the occupied territories include degradation of the infrastructure, land confiscation, water depletion, uprooting of trees, dumping of toxic waste and other pollution. This inherent right of the Palestinian people is also the subject of Israel’s State obligations under, among others, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which it ratified in 1991.
- Palestinian entitlements for water include the underground water of the West Bank and Gaza aquifers, in addition to their rightful shares in the waters of the Jordan River as riparians. The annual renewable freshwater yield in the occupied territories ranges from 600 million cubic metres to 650 million cubic metres. The West Bank’s hydrological system includes three major aquifers: the western, north-eastern and eastern basins.
- The Palestinian use of the Jordan River before 1967 was through 140 pumping units. Israel either confiscated or destroyed all of those pumping units. In addition, Israel closed the large, irrigated areas of the Jordan Valley used by Palestinians, calling them military zones that later were transferred to Israeli settlers.
- At present Israel extracts more than 85 per cent of the Palestinian water from the West Bank aquifers, which accounts for about 25 per cent of Israel’s water use. As a result of Israeli restrictions, Palestinians currently use 246 million cubic metres of their water resources to supply nearly 3 million people in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip with their domestic, industrial and agricultural needs. This compares to Israel’s use of 1,959 million cubic metres for its population of approximately 6 million. That reduces water consumption by Palestinians to 82 m3 per capita, as compared with 340 m3 for Israeli citizens and settlers.
- Israel provides settlers with a continuous and plentiful water supply, largely from Palestinian water resources. The supply to Palestinians is intermittent, especially during summer months, as was the case in 1999 11
The River Jordan had an average flow of 1250 million cubic meters (mcm) per year at the Allenby Bridge 12 but now only has less than 200 mcm 13. This reduced flow is essentially all due to the removal of headwaters for Israeli use. The Palestinian used the Jordan River before 1967 was through 140 pumping units. Immediately after the occupation these pumping units were either destroyed or confiscated by Israeli authorities. Palestinians are currently utilizing less than 0.5% of the Jordan's waters and Israel, which uses most of this water, would be eligible by its pre-1967 borders for only 3% of the Jordan basin area. After a thorough review of the hydrological data, Elmusa concluded that:
Since 1967, Israel has had a firm grip over virtually all he ground water resources of geographic Palestine and the Jordan River's head waters ... Israel takes 80-90% of the freshwater resources of geographic Palestine. Included in this figure are the shares of Israel and the West Bank under the Johnston Plan a US plan for distribution of water based on population. The disparity in extraction between the two sides has translated into a conspicuous water gap in all sectors. The Palestinian per capita municipal use, irrigation use, and aggregate use are less than 30 percent of Israelis'. In all, the water supply in the West Bank and Gaza is substandard and intermittent. The pipe distribution network is dilapidated and its complements, the sewage system and water treatment plants, are critically lacking ... The gap is even more conspicuous between the Palestinians and the Israeli settlers who consume five to six times as much per capita as do the Palestinians and are profligate irrigation water users 14
While Palestinian land was being confiscated and their water allocation slowly diminished, the area of Israeli controlled irrigated land grew by 340,000 dunums between 1970 and 1990 15. In addition to this large scale diversion of water resources, Israel declared most of the Jordan valley and large tracts of the best agricultural lands in the West Bank as closed military zones for a period of time resulting in the shutdown of Palestinian agriculture in the area. These vast tracks of Palestinian agricultural lands that were confiscated were then turned over to Jewish settlements.
Final status negotiations bogged down not just on the refugee status and Jerusalem, but also due to Israel's insistence on maintaining leverage and control over most of the water resources. Even the agreements signed in Oslo and the creation of the Palestine Water Authority 16 were like other Oslo agreements – devoid of any equality or even meaning in terms of enforcement and control over water resources. The basic elements of fair distribution of water based on per capita are provided by A. Tamimi based on International treaties, but Israel controlled water allocation and use in the Palestinian occupied areas in very unfair ways 17. The problem is exacerbated because "the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel have a high degree of hydrological interdependence in the sense that most of the fresh, renewable resources in geographic Palestine are common to both sides" and thus it is difficult to ensure separate and equal resources 18.
Israeli colonies in the occupied areas were intended for security and control. Thus, most land confiscation and colonial settlement activity was intentionally concentrated on the high grounds (hills and mountains). Due to this peculiar arrangement, a runoff of wastewater, pollution from industrial colonists in declared “industrial zones”, and soil erosion on the hills directly impacted Palestinian communities located in the lower areas adjacent to these colonies 19. The UN Commission on Human Rights documented this effect in the year 2000. In part it stated:
- Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem are typically placed on high ground. Wastewater from many settlements is collected and discharged to the nearby valleys without treatment. The Special Rapporteur observed that Kfar Darom Israeli settlement in the Gaza Strip releases its sewage and chemical waste left from the industrial plants to the Palestinian Al-Saqa Valley in the central part of the Gaza Strip.
- Israelis dump solid waste without restriction on Palestinian land, fields, and side roads. The solid waste generated in West Jerusalem, for example, is transferred to an unsanitary dumping site east of Abu Dis. That site in the West Bank overlays the infiltration area of the eastern sector of the water aquifer. Also, the settlements of Ariel, Innab, Homesh Alon Morieh, Qarna Shamron, Kadumim and others dispose of their solid waste in the West Bank, as do military camps and settlements inside the "green line" (1948 border of Israel).
- The Government of Israel has constructed at least seven industrial zones in the West Bank and two in Gaza. The West Bank zones occupy a total area of approximately 302 hectares. They are located mainly on hilltops, from which they dump industrial wastewater onto adjacent Palestinian lands. Information about industries in the Israeli industrial zones is not accessible to the Palestinians. Palestinian sources estimate that at least 200 Israeli factories operate in the West Bank. Some of the products are identifiable, but detailed information on quantities produced, labour, and waste generated is not available. Aluminium, leather-tanning, textile-dyeing, batteries, fibreglass, plastic, and chemicals are among the known industries within these settlements.
- The Special Rapporteur visited the Barqan industrial zone, in the West Bank, which is a clear example of environmental pollution. Aluminium, fibreglass, plastics, electroplating and military industries are known to operate inside Barqan. The industrial wastewater that flows untreated to the nearby valley damages agricultural land belonging to the neighbouring Palestinian villages of Sarta, Kafr al-Dik, and Burqin, polluting the groundwater with heavy metals 20
Israeli colonies were planned for security and ideological reasons and thus built on hilltops dotting the Palestinian landscape. These colonies fit into a pattern as to control the natural resources and control the native Palestinian population. Thus, there was no forethought on environmental sustainability or clear ideas to ensure population harmony with the resources and the environment. We find that there are settlements in every Palestinian district and facilities such as sewage treatment plants are not made available to the local Palestinian population. Untreated sewage water is discharged and in most cases, this discharge directly goes to the areas inhabited or farmed by Palestinians.
The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel in 1967 also opened up a window of opportunity for Israeli industries to escape the rejection by communities in which they existed. Many of the highest polluting companies simply moved, and actually were provided with tax incentives, to the West Bank and Gaza where Israeli government regulations were more lax. There the companies only faced the opposition of native Palestinians who had no realistic way to stop them. For example, Geshuri Industries, a manufacturer of pesticides and fertilizers which faced significant court setbacks in its original plant in Kfar Saba was moved to an area adjacent to Tulkarm inside the West Bank in 1987. Significant pollution from this and other companies in this area has damaged citrus and vineyards.
Prosperity with Equality and Sustainability
Environmental degradation in Palestine began in the 19th century with industrialization and large-scale deforestation. Under the Ottoman Empire for example, large tracts of forests in the Eastern Mediterranean region were cut down for fuel and tracks for the railroads (e.g. the Damascus to Hijaz railroad). During the British rule (1917-1948), some reforestation efforts were carried out. In the areas of Palestine that came under Israeli and Jordanian rule (1948-1967) programs of forestation were also common. When the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli rule in 1967, all the forestation programs in those areas were halted and the trends reversed, and Israel started to shift its population to settle in the occupied areas. Rules were introduced that prevented Palestinians not only from doing much of their usual agriculture but also from managing forested lands. In fact, many forested hills were immediately converted to residential settlement/colonial projects that generated far more pollution than similar settlements inside Israel proper (where there was more regulation). Alon Tal, Founder of the Israel Union for Environmental Defense, acknowledged that: "...it's a Zionist paradox. We came here to redeem a land and we end up contaminating it" 21.
The direct impact of the Israeli policies on impoverishment of local Palestinians is illustrated best in the agricultural sector. In 1966-1967 and just before these areas came under Israeli control, 43% of Palestinian employment was in the agricultural sector specifically on 1945 square kilometers (or 31.5%) of the West Bank and Gaza. By 1994, this had shrunk to less than 22% of employment and on half the land (15% of the land) 22. The other half is basically now under the control of the Jewish settlements. As the Israeli population in the occupied areas grew at an annual rate of 8-10% between 1995-2000 compared to a little over 2% within the green line, this ecological impact intensified.
Since these areas are now fully integrated, a solution to the environmental issues in the context of a two-state scenario has become virtually impossible. The area is just two small and people of all religions are mixed if not fully integrated. A unitary economic and environmental policy must be taken into consideration that fits within basic elements of justice based on human rights. In the context of a two state solution, Israel would insist on retaining Jewish majority and thus on return of Palestinian refugees to only areas in the West Bank and Gaza. These incidentally happen to be the areas already with high density of refugees and displaced people and areas of extreme environmental stress as discussed above. They also house over 400,000 Jewish settlers. Some refugees will want to be resettled in other countries. However, those wanting to return to their villages within the Green line would do far less environmental damage than forcing them into Gaza or the West Bank. They would also have a far better economic future in a unitary state than they would in the enclaves which are envisioned for a Palestinian statelet in the West Bank and Gaza. Adding more Palestinian refugees to the already-devastated West Bank and Gaza would do severe environmental damage and affect the quality of life for people throughout geographic Palestine/land of Canaan. A decreased pressure to bring foreigners from all over the world to maintain the Zionist dream would also have better economic and environmental consequences for all who are already in the Land of Canaan. A unified policy of distributing people to areas of least environmental impact throughout the region would be far more rational.
There are many other advantages to the solution advocated in this book and by many Israelis and Palestinians. This solution envisions integration and removal of borders and barriers in the context of regional sustained prosperity and stability. Reasons for this are numerous:
1) This solution provides all people with a stake in insuring environmental sustainability for their shared space.
2) Building a unified economy reduces redundancy of needed infrastructure.
3) The abandonment of the pressure to bring in immigrants from around the world to keep the demographic "fight" for maintenance of the "Jewish majority."
4) The increased prosperity of existing Palestinians in the area will ultimately result in reduced population growth. It is well documented that higher poverty is positively correlated with higher birth rates (Gaza refugee camps for example have the highest birth rates).
5) Peace with justice will bring incredible outside resources (there is already talk of a "Marshal-like" plan). These resources will reduce the pressure on locals to engage in environmentally harmful practices and industries such as military industry and build-up and reliance on old inefficient technologies.
Notes to Chapter 10.
1. Sara M. Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), p. 51.
2. M. Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).
3. Itzhak Ravid, The Demographic Revolution, presented at the Herzliya Conference, December 2001, http://www.herzliyaconference.org
4. Haaretz, 02/12/2002, Report: Education has contributed to growing economic gaps http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=236901&contrassID=1&subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=0
5. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories: A Guide. Report of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, March 2002, http://www.fmep.org/reports/2002/sr0203.html
6. Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Adopted on 12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, held in Geneva from 21 April to 12 August, 1949 entry into force 21 October 1950. Also available at http://18.104.22.168/html/menu3/b/92.htm
7. UN Security Council Resolution 465 and other UNSC resolutions are available via UN publications and on the UN web pages.
8. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories: A Guide, Report of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, March 2002, http://www.fmep.org/reports/2002/sr0203.html
9. Built-up area calculations according to Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem, http://www.arij.org
10. T. Stauffer, Water and War in the Middle East: The Hydraulic Parameters of Conflict, (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine); J. Isaac, The essentials of sustainable water resource management in Israel & Palestine, Arab Studies Quarterly, (2000), 22(2):13-31.
11. . UN Commission of Human Rights. Fifty-sixth session, Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. Report on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, submitted by Mr. Giorgio Giacomelli, Special Rapporteur, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/2 A. http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2000/documentation/commission/e-cn4-2000-25.htm
12. C. Main The unified development of the water resources of the Jordan Valley Region, (Tennessee Valley Authority, 1953).
13. A. Soffer, The relevance of Johnston Plan to the reality of 1993 and beyond, in J. Isaac and H. Shuval, Water and Peace in the Middle East, (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994).
14. Sharif S. Elmusa, Water Conflict: Economics, Politics, Law and Palestinian-Israeli Water Resources, (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998), p. 351.
15. S. El Musa, Al Miya fi al Mufawadat al Filistiniyah - al Israiliyah,, (Beirut;1997), p.42 (in Arabic).
16. See documents posted at the Euro-Mediterranean Information System on the know-how in the Water Sector http://www.semide-ps.org/documentation.htm
17. A. Tamimi, A Technical Framework for Final-Status Negotiations over Water, Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol.III, No.3/4, 1996, p.68.
18. Sharif S. Elmusa, Water Conflict: Economics, Politics, Law and Palestinian-Israeli Water Resources, (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998), p. 348
19. Qumsieh, V., The Environmental Impact of Jewish Settlements in the West Bank, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture. Volume V, No. 1, 1998, p. 32
20. UN Commission of Human Rights, ibid
21. L. Beyer, Trashing the Holy Land, Time, Sept. 7, 1998, p. 62.
22. The Socio-economic Impact of Settlements on Land, Water, and the Palestinian Economy, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Washington, DC 1998.
Sharif S. Elmusa, Water Conflict: Economics, Politics, Law and Palestinian-Israeli Water Resources, (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998).
Stephen C. Lonergan, David B. Brooks, Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (Oslo: Unipub, 1995).
Sara Roy and Karen Pfeifer (Editors), The Economics of Middle East Peace: A Reassessment, (JAI Press, 1999).
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